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Forward
Abstract
What started off as a question on the possibly of data transmission via sound above the
level of human hearing evolved into a project exploring the possibility of ultrasonic data
infiltration and exfiltration in an information security context. It is well known that sound can be
used to transmit data as this can be seen in many old technologies, most notably and simply
DTMF tones for phone networks. But what if the sound used to transmit signals was in in the
ultrasonic range? It would go generally unnoticed to anyone not looking for it with tools such as
a spectrum analyzer. This could provide an unnoticed means of transmitting overhead data
without the use of radio signals or physical connections, or, more clandestinely, a means to inject
or retrieve data virtually undetected for espionage, control, or other malicious activity. As
expected, there would obviously be issues with signal quality as the open air is heavy with
environmental interference, but in specific cases as seen in the following research, a discrete
sonic means of data transmission may not only be practical, but necessary for the task at hand.
This project is an exploration of the practicality of ultrasonic data transmission between
computers. It will include research into the topic in general from scientific, technological, and
security perspectives. There will be inclusions from other research projects as well as practical
applications already in existence. Interestingly, there are already some suspected, but
unconfirmed planned systems as well security incidents using this technology. Finally, a short
series of semi-formal (in a scientific sense) experiments conducted to provide firsthand accounts
and results of the ultrasonic data transmission concept.
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Joint Project Statement
This project was a joint effort between myself, Alex Edwards, and Hunter Young. We are
both seniors in Kennesaw State University’s Bachelor of Information Security and Assurance
program. This became a mutual idea with collaborative research occurring on a regular basis.
With academic approval, we moved forward with the formal project. Out of many reasons, the
need for pooling of resources and ideas provided the necessity for a joint project. The
experiments we conducted often needed multiple computers and at least two people across a
distance.
While most of our data and sources of research will be identical, these reports are
individual efforts with the last step of collaboration being a shared dump of experiment results
and ideas about the subject. Hunter and I have similar experience with information security and
information technology in general with myself having amateur radio and more professional IT
experience and Hunter having more experience in music and acoustics. This provides a unique
opportunity to produce two conclusions, each of a slightly different perspective and background,
from similar data. There will be intentionally concurrent sections, and correlations beyond
experimentation and joint research could be considered a blind consensus between Hunter and I.
Initial Theory
While the concept of ultrasonic data transmission can cover a wide range of practical uses,
steganography is of pinnacle interest to those in the information security field. By nature,
transmitting anything by ultrasound can be considered steganography as the data is publicly “in
the air” but is hidden by anyone not looking for it. Further, because the ultrasound would be a
significantly higher frequency than most noise or music, it may be able to better pierce through
interference and could be played with music or imbedded into music files.
5
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For cyber security, the ability to discretely remove data or carry a malicious payload in
the form of sound presents many opportunities and threats. This theory is amplified by the fact
that, while network cables can be unplugged and WiFi radios turned off, most modern computers,
especially consumer laptops and phones, have built in microphones and speakers that can be
utilized maliciously to compromise or control those compromised systems.
As initial research was conducted, keeping other ideas in mind, “Can this be used to
deploy or control malware and how hard is it to stop that?” became the most pressing theoretical
question regarding cyber security practicality. What we found reported on the internet and what
we were able to accomplish in our experiments proved interesting.
Executive Summary
This report will start with a basic explanation of the science behind sound in a physical
sense, and then the practice of modulating waves to carry information. Human hearing’s limits
and the limitations imposed by the properties of ultrasound itself will be discussed. Technology,
including both audio equipment and audio software will be discussed also. Finally, information
security in general, as well as networking, steganography, and data infiltration/exfiltration will
be covered. These first three major sections will provide a background for our investigations.
This report assumes a basic grasp of these concepts already. Some terms will be explained inline
where relevant to the topic at hand.
As expected, there were very few sources to comment on as ultrasonic data transmission
and steganography, at least in the use case presented here. However, a potential security and
commercial incidence were discovered as well as several short reports discussing specific tests in
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depth. The first case from Fraunhofer FKIE, was the closest match to our own theory and
investigations.
While the tests were narrowed down from earlier plans to meet realistic and in-scope
goals, the overall creation of a proof of concept was successful and yielded useful results toward
practical conclusions in close concurrence to our research, but also with some interesting
variances. Finally, after conclusions are presented, keeping with the theme of practicality, a
discussion is included covering suggestions for applications, scenarios, and security controls.
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Acoustics
Sound Waves
As many already know, sound is transmitted by the movement of areas of matter that
have been compressed or decompressed relative to the rest pressure of a physical medium. These
periods of compression travel through a medium from the source in a spherical pattern (assuming
no obstacles are present) from the source in the form of a wave. These waves may be absorbed
by surfaced and converted into other forms of kinetic energy. Also they may be refracted upon
the transition between mediums or reflected back toward the source or in perpendicular direction
entirely. These concepts are important to the physical characteristics placing features and
restrains on the ability of sound to transmit data.
Along with light, sound is one of our oldest methods of communication principally in the
form of speech and also with signals as with sirens or beeps and to deliver entertainment in the
form of music. In addition to analog modes, sound is also able to represent digital data in a
primitive form. Different frequencies and patters are used to convey messages.
Mode and Modulation
On a more complicated level, as with electromagnetic energy, both types of waves can
carry more complicated signals via different modes such as AM and FM. While sound signals,
like speech and music, are analog and arbitrary in regard to mode, digital information usually
requires a uniform mode. This is often more apparent in electromagnetic waves in the light and
radio spectrum. There a multitude of modes in use from the simple constant wave (CW) used for
Morse code to amplitude modulation (AM) and frequency modulation (FM) used for analog
music and voice. Other, more complex modes are usually combinations of theses simpler modes
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and alternate between them in a pattern. Slower, but higher fidelity digital modes like phase shift
keying (PSK) and frequency shift keying (PSK) are often used for long distance communication
while faster, but more fragile, forms of modulation like quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM)
used by digital cable TV and WiFi. For our tests, we stuck to one mode, FSK. Justification for
this will be provided in later sections. FSK changes the frequency of a wave between two
predetermined frequencies, a mark and space frequency, to represent ones and zeroes. As you
will see later, the speed that data travels over these methods is measured in baud, or the number
of symbols changes per second.
Human Hearing
When these soundwaves reach a human, they travel down the ear canal, impact the
eardrum where the kinetic energy absorbed causes the eardrum to vibrate and the connected
bones to vibrate. These bones vibrate liquid in the inner ear, which in turn vibrates small fibers
attached to nerves. Human hearing range, frequency wise, is roughly 20Hz to 20kHz with many
factors contributing to the shrinking of this range, most notably age and occupational damage
(Smith). In our tests, we noticed that approximately 17.5kHz was the upper limit of human
hearing among ourselves and other college students with the upper range causing a sense of
irritation more than an actual perception of sound.
This provides two main reinforcements to why steganography can be achieved by
transmitting data sonically above the range of human hearing. While a human would have a hard
time interpreting a spontaneous unexpected audible signal, any strange unexplained sounds,
especially those emanating from electronic devices would be cause for curiosity and
investigation. Also, because humans generate sound intentionally on a regular basis for other
humans to hear, ultrasonic signals would be in frequencies above the range of human hearing and
9
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therefore would not be interfered with and could be combined with these noises for concealment
as you will see in one of our proofs of concept.
Limitations
The same background sounds (environmental noise, music, speech) that can be used to
provide distraction, concealment, or a means of steganography might also be a source of
destructive interference that can threaten the fidelity of a data signal. Practically, the farther away
two sounds are in frequency (including their harmonics) the less interference. Technically, there
can be constructive and destructive interference. With destructive interference, the high pressure
zones of two or more soundwaves are at opposite alternating or unsynchronized times, canceling
out net changes and pressure and reducing the volume of each sound. While humans might not
produce ultrasonic interface, machines might, especially electrical components in the devices
that would be transmitting and receiving signals.
Aside from background noise, the propagation ability of ultrasound may be diminished
compared to lower frequency noise. Many factors in the medium of travel as well as objects in
the path of the sound could affect ultrasound differently than sounds in the human hearing range.
This could be a research study in itself, but this investigation is mostly concerned with the
practical ramification. We performed out tests in different environments because of this. We did
find that ultrasound, at the same volume from the same device, did not diffract outside of a
doorway as well as other sounds did thus demonstrated the ability for ultrasonic signals to by
physically contained to a room.
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Technology
Equipment and Hardware
Because we are testing ultrasonic data transmission and steganography in an information
security context with computers and mobile devices in particular, it is important to confine the
scope of tests and research to the microphones and speakers already installed on the devices.
Almost all modern computers and mobile devices, save for a few desktops and higher end
specific purpose machines, are sold with audio devices.
Microphones have diaphragms that vibrate when sound waves are absorbed much like
eardrums. Speakers work in reverse by vibrating the diaphragm to produce sound waves in the
air. Design varies by type of microphone or speaker, but in general they consist of a magnet and
a coil of wire with one or the other moving. Receiving sound produces fluctuations in the
electrical current in the coil and the wires attached, producing an electrical representation of a
sound wave. To create sound, the process is reversed by feeding a fluctuating current into the
speaker and moving the diaphragm. From out tests, we have discovered that these devices have
no problem generating and detecting ultrasonic signals under 20kHz.
Audio Sampling and Compression (Digital/Analog)
When analog sound is converted to electricity by a microphone, it travels to some kind of
digital to analog converter most often referred to as a “sound card” in computer. The electronic
representation of sound is digitized by taking measurements of the amplitude at regular intervals
in a process called “sampling.” The reverse of this process creates sound from a speaker. The
number of measurements per second is referred to as the “sampling rate” and is typically
44.1kHz as the default for consumer electronics. “Bit depth” is the number of digital bits used to
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represent each sample, with 16bit being the consumer standard (Production Bytes, 2012). Both
of these are proportional to the fidelity of an audio signal and together make up the “bit rate” of
an audio signal.
When considering the ability to store ultrasonic data in audio files, especially discretely,
digital audio has limits beyond the capability of hardware. MP3 is the most common format for
storing audio. It is a “lossy” format meaning that to create a smaller file, the audio is
“compressed” by removing data. The actual compression algorithm is complex, but has two
factors that impede its ability to carry data electronically. Typically, MP3s have a much lower bit
rate than “raw” formats like WAV. Also, MP3 was also designed to save space by removing
audio, such as ultrasound, that is considered to not be relevantly perceivable to humans (MP3,
2016). One of our very first tests (separate from our main experiments) consisted of trying to
interpret an ultrasonic data signal after it was converted to MP3 and played. The signal was
almost completely destroyed.
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Information Security Concepts
Information Security
For this project, the primary information security concern will be cyber security. This
covers both the devices themselves and any information on them at risk. To protect the
confidentiality and integrity of information assets, many technical and procedural security
controls have been developed over the years to protect these electronic devices including
firewalls, malware scanners, access control infrastructures, and encryption. Many of the typical
vectors of attack have some kind of preventative or mitigating control.
Networking
Network security falls under the realm of cyber security, and since the beginning of the
internet age, the use of networking to share information between electronic devices locally and
across the world is ubiquitous and constant. These networking mediums are potential vectors for
remote attackers wishing to compromise a system to gain control, acquire confidential
information on it, or otherwise damage the information or the device itself. These devices are
networked via some type of connection usually Ethernet, WiFi, Cellular using any number of
protocols and infrastructures. We have long had the capability to encrypt our communication
channels, filter unwanted connections and content, authenticate the integrity of the received and
sent information, to isolate and control access to networks, or completely block the flow of
information by turning the networking hardware off.
While these attack vectors have security controls, the possibility of network data flow via
the audio equipment on the device widens the potential attack surface into uncontrolled and
unsecured territory. Turning off networking equipment, unplugging cables, and even removing
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wireless LAN hardware to ensure that that there is no unauthorized data infiltration or
exfiltration is known as an “air gap.” The physical network isolation that an air gap provides may
be overcome by the fact that audio equipment would almost never be considered as a means of
digital data transmission and that sound uses the air itself as a physical medium to transmit
signals.
Steganography
The most common way to prevent unauthorized access to information on a network or
computer is encryption. With encryption, information is scrambled into a virtually unreadable
code that requires a key to decrypt the ciphertext. However, another, more basic method,
steganography, is also used, more often maliciously. Instead of rendering data unreadable,
steganography hides data among seemly normal traffic or noise. This prevents reading of the
data as it is intended to go unnoticed, unlike encryption. This is often seen in the cyber security
world when malware files have seemingly harmless names or in the more novelty practice of
hiding one file within another file of a different type for example.
While anti-malware can often prevent or mitigate the use of steganography to hide
malicious files by scanning everything for matches to signatures of know malware or by heuristic
analysis of the behavior of potential malware, many technical security controls are not designed
to handle the obscurity of ultrasonic data stenography.
Ultrasonic signals are stenographic in nature because they are above the range of human
hearing and can be hidden in innocent sounding audio files without degradation to fidelity. A
seemingly harmless listener program can sit on system for years and not be detected because the
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malicious instructions or data to be infiltrated are not stored in the program, but are received or
transmitted in the air in real time during execution.
Data Infiltration and Exfiltration
Data can mean many things; here, the concern is mostly sensitive information such as
credit card numbers, trade secrets, or intelligence adding in further compromise of a system and
also data as commands or instructions such as scripts, codes, and prompts. Covert retrieval of or
leakage of this sensitive data from an otherwise secure system is exfiltration. The placement of
data for the purposes of planting a file or delivery of malicious code on a similarly assumed
secure system is infiltration. Recently stated in the preceding sections, infiltration of a payload
with an ultrasonic signal via an assumed secure system’s audio equipment is of particular
concern and will be references again in a few later sections.
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Occurrences In The Wild
Reported Incidents
There are multiple internet articles, some skeptical, about a security researcher’s
investigation of a BIOS (basically the firmware of a motherboard) based rootkit, dubbed
“badBIOS,” that seems to be communicating between infected systems via ultrasound. The
malware is reported to persist on the computers firmware across BIOS flashes and operating
system reinstalls and preventing the booting from removable media like CDs and flash drives.
The malware is reported to initially infect via USB, make a large number of minor configuration
changes, and exchange data between infected computers. Data packet flow was detected between
two air gapped infected computer despite being unplugged from power and having all
networking hardware removed. The packet flow stopped after the audio hardware was removed
(Goodin, 2013). This is assumed to be a hoax by some, as other researchers believe the ultrasonic
signals to be artifacts from other sources and the fact the original reporter, Dragos Ruiu, does not
provide much evidence of his ongoing investigation (Grimes, 2013).
The Center for Democracy and Technology recently submitted a report to the Federal
Trade Commission regarding the privacy concerns over cross device tracking technology.
Among these include a company called SilverPush’s use of ultrasonic beacons to synchronize
and analyze advertisement content allowing better targeting of marketing across media.. When a
user accesses a website or watches a commercial from a SilverPush enabled advertiser, an
ultrasonic beacon is played. SilverPush enabled apps on phones and tablets listen for this beacon
and report the correlations between television choices, app usage, time, and location depending
on the beacon. They have stated that distance is a major limiting factor of this technology. It is
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not known if these beacons are digital data or analog markers (Center for Democracy &
Technology, 2015), (Bansal, 2015).
Others’ Research
This is a bleeding-edge concept, so research into it, especially in an information security
context, is extremely limited. However, some scholars and security researches have touched on
this concept. Many possible sources of information just seemed to point back to these same
articles offering no new information, usually, it was the study below.
Michael Hanspach and Michael Goetz, two researchers at Fraunhofer FKIE, produced a
paper stating that they were able to use a proprietary network stack (set of software and
protocols) intended for sonic communication in another project to create an ultrasonic meshnet
between laptops with a 20 bit per second speed at a distance of up to 19.7m. They were
successfully able to have a keylogger transmit recorded keystrokes across a meshnet of
computers and collect the keystrokes of the primary victim computer on remote system
(Hanspach & Goetz, 2014). This confirms the validity of the concern that ultrasonic data
transmission between systems is a security threat.
Other researchers at University of Oklahoma were able to achieve ultrasonic data
transmission via FSK with a bit rate of up to 800 bits per second. However, their experiment was
slightly different. They were testing the feasibility of transmitting data across solid metal
mediums that would otherwise block radio signals. They used ultrasonic transducers (similar to
speakers) to transmit data along steel beams (Multi-Tone FSK for Ultrasonic Communication,
2015). This is an interesting concept because high security organizations do employ controls that
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prevent radio signals from propagating into or out of the building. However, it does not employ
stock hardware that normal consumer electronics would use.
Wentao Jiang published an article at University College Cork, Ireland providing a few
possible theoretical uses for ultrasonic data transmission. Most of his scenarios were for
applications where data had to be transmitted, but where radio transmission would be harmful or
dangerous to people or other equipment, but also suggested the possibility that it could be used to
make a more secure wireless network as ultrasound is more easily contained to a room than radio
waves (Jiang, 2014).
A developer named Katee wrote a fledgling chat program called “Quietnet” that sends
ASCII symbols to other computers at around 19kHz and is intended as a way to discretely chat
locally without exposing the text to interception by a packet sniffer. The developer states that
Minimodem and GNU Radio, software we use for our tests, are much better than her software
though (Katee, 2014).
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Testing
Hypothesis
Building on the Initial Theory section, it was important to reduce our testing ideas to fit
our constraints. Our tests, and therefore our hypothesis, had to be broken into stages. Overall,
based on the research and our knowledge of the underlying science, successful creation a proof
of concept seemed achievable. The inability to compress ultrasound; ability to transmit ultrasonic
data over a distance; the ability to receive, demodulate and parse that data; and the ability to use
music as a means of delivery and steganography was hypothesized and tested in those stages.
Hunter’s hypothesis and following interpretations of results might differ from mine in his
analysis.
Constraints
When first planning out the project, Hunter and I assumed a massive array of tests with
many variables. However, as we did research on the nature of the project, we determined that
certain environmental factors, software availabilities, time constraints, pre-testing, and practical
application narrowed down the necessity and ability to experiment with the multitude of
independent variables originally designed. Part of this investigation was learning which tests
were not feasible. If they were difficult and impractical for us to test, developers and hackers
would likely avoid them also. Most importantly, we incorporated a lot of publicly available
freeware that not only existentially reinforced our arguments, but also allowed us to move
forward to an easily reproducible, practical proof of concept.
While our first test used an ultrasonic radio developed with GNU Radio, later tests
utilized software called Minimodem, an audio modem built for Linux by Kamal Mostafa that
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utilizes FSK (Mostafa, 2016). This imposed a few very relevant constraints on our test aside
from the fact that it was the best available means for our test. FSK is a digital mode that strikes a
reasonable balance between the slow, high fidelity modes like CW, and the fast, dynamic, but
complex and fragile modes like QAM. Also, we can eliminate temporal modes such as PSK. The
creator of the GNU Radio method we used for initial tinkering reinforces this determination as
he also claims FSK is superior to PSK in his tests (Anfractuosity). Regarding time, taking more
time to transmit a signal can provide for higher fidelity in theory, but the longer time also allows
more time to collect interference. These factors are seriously dependent on the mode and
environmental noise, though. Most importantly, in regards to practicality, Minimodem is open
source, meaning the source code is public. An attacker building malware using this technology
would most likely try to incorporate and augment already proven code into their programming
rather that tediously “reinventing the wheel” for the same functionality. This allowed us to
reasonably eliminate another independent variable.
Because of the availability of testing software like Minimodem and GNU Radio on the
Linux platform, most of our transmission tests were confined to Linux only. While it is important
to consider other operating systems like Windows, especially when discussing malware, utilizing
the concepts presented here on other systems is a matter of programming or “porting” software
to those platforms in some way. This is a software development issue and is not within the scope
of our tests. While some differences may be introduced by drivers and other audio processing
software, the hardware can be considered a constant.
As stated before, the use of stock hardware is important when considered from an
information security perspective. We are testing the ability to use ultrasound for data
transmission discretely; therefore, all testing device hardware was unmodified. It was acceptable
20
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to use both cell phones and laptops as both are in common use as computing devices and
containers of information assets. Another hardware affected independent variable we eliminated
was loudness, as the amplitude capability varies among the different hardware and volume may
be increased up until the point of audio distortion providing a theoretical boost to range, but that
concept is not very relevant to our investigation. Four our tests, we used the maximum system
volume on each device. This provides a pseudo constant, as the hardware on each device is
different.
Testing Narrative
Before trying our main proof concept, we conducted two informal experiments to test our
ability to move forward with the main experiment. Using, GNU radio, an open source visual tool
to construct software defined radios in Linux, and using the radio setup developed by
Anfractuosity on Hunter’s laptop, he was able to transmit text via ultrasound (Anfractuosity).
While we did not test the ability to receive and interpret the transmission back into text, we did
test the ability to receive the signal on another device (verified by spectrum analyzer on a phone)
across a crowded room in the Burruss building. Interestingly, the physical containment concept
from previous sections was reinforced as the signal was not detected outside of the doorway.
While we assumed MP3 compression would destroy an ultrasonic signal, I still tested that as well.
Using the open source audio editing software Audacity, I tested the integrity of an ultrasound
slow scan television signal after conversion to MP3 so that I could better visualize the effect of
compression on it. The signal was reduced to mostly static.
We began Minimodem tests with two laptops, both running Ubuntu Linux, a modern Dell
Ultrabook (XPS 9340) as the receiver and an older Dell netbook (Latitude 2100) as the
transmitter. We conducted these tests in the common area of a dorm. At first, we were testing
21
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with the Badout character set that is traditionally used for Radio Teletype (RTTY). It provides
greater speed due to its simplicity, but we realized a fundamental problem in that it was case
insensitive when many device operating system commands and data formats are case sensitive,
we soon witched to ASCII. We began testing different frequencies between 17kHz and 20kHz
in .1kHz intervals and testing their ability to transmit data. As stated before, while slowing down
the transmission rate, or baud, would, in initial theory, provide higher fidelity; it also allows
more exposure to interference. We experimented with a few baud rates, but decided to stick with
45 baud as it produced the best results over multiple tests. Coincidently, 45 baud is also the most
common speed for amateur radio teletype (Radioteletype, 2016). We encountered sporadic
problems when the laptop microphones and speakers were not pointed at each other, so we began
testing sending text between the devices with their fronts facing each other, for the greatest
stability in results, and moved them farther apart each test to get a maximum distance that we
were reliably able to transmit text without error. We determined the best overall transmission
parameters were 45 baud ASCII with a space frequency of 18.6kHz and a mark frequency of
18.7kHz. This will be explained more in the next section. To start the transmitter at the command
line, minimodem --tx -S 18600 -M 18700 45 --ascii was entered and text messages were sent
afterwards by typing and pressing enter at the command line (receiving command will be
demonstrated in the next paragraph).
Our selection of text to transfer between the laptops was arbitrary, but after we were able
to determine the best workable parameters, we needed to test the ability to control the computer
with ultrasonic commands. Therefore we chose the command cat etc/passwd, which returns the
user accounts of the system. To receive the ultrasonic commands and pipe them to the command
shell for execution the command minimodem --rx -S 18600 -M 18700 45 --ascii -c 2.5 -q | sh
22
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was used to start the listener on the Ultrabook. There are two new flags in this command. “-c”
represents the “confidence threshold” or the minimum signal quality the program will accept.
Basically, it acts as the squelch, but was not well documented beyond what we could ascertain.
2.5 was high enough to reject most interference, but not reject the intended transmission. The “-q”
flag removes metadata or debug output about the received signal so only the command is passed
to the command shell.
Finally, we needed to test the ability to use steganography. We chose Sandstorm by
Darude as the innocuous carrier of the previous ultrasonic audio payload and the test of the
resistance to interference when using the music to hide the signal. We knew from earlier tests
that MP3 compression damages the ultrasonic signals, so, we combined the audio in Audacity by
having it record the speaker output of the signal with the buffer spacing, imported the Sandstorm
MP3, and exported it to a raw .WAV file for our tests. We tested the ability to send commands to
a discretely listening computer and also took spectrograph images of the signal in different
environments.
After this, we wanted to collect some data about different environments beyond or initial
proof of concept and provide some acoustical context about those environments while allowing
visualization of their effect on the noise profile. To do this, we took the audio file from our
previous test and the ultrasonic transmission without the music, and played them on my phone
(Motorola XT926M) while collecting spectrograph images with a Spectrum Analyzer app on
Hunter’s phone (OnePlus One). We took a screenshot of the background noise, playing of the
ultrasonic signal, and then the signal and music combined in the dorm where our initial tests
were conducted, outside of the dorm with traffic going by, a server room, and the KSU
Commons. We also repeated our previous tests with the laptops. The last two, a server room and
23
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a crowded area represent two environments where ultrasonic steganography usage or attacks
might occur. The results are in the next section.
Results and Examples
Most of our tests were conducted with ‘yes’ or ‘no’ possible conclusions until the final
environmental tests with the spectrum analyzer. This project is approached from an information
security perspective rather than a scientific one. Empirical data is not as important as the
practical ability to produce a functioning proof of concept. Also, an abundance of empirical data
is not as relevant to the overall question at had as, when dealing with acoustics, there are too
many independent variables imposed by the changing environmental factors and the materials
used with testing. However, the evidence presented here should provide a glimpse into the realworld possibility of using ultrasonic transmission for data stenography.
From our tests in the dorm common area it was determined that the best transmission
parameters using Minimodem, when considering the relevance to cyber security, was using the
ASCII character set at 45 baud, FSK with a space frequency of 18.6kHz and mark frequency of
18.7kHz. With the two laptops facing, were able to receive transmissions without error at a
distance of up to 8 feet. These tests were repeated outside of the dorm by a busy road, in server
room, and in the crowded KSU Commons. The observable difference was that the usable
distance shrank to 6 feet outside and in the server room.
The following is an image of the receiving laptop trying to read a signal at 19.7kHz was
one of our tests trying to pinpoint a good frequency. Notice the errors in receiving when the
signal is closer to the observed ~20kHz usable limit when trying to receive. This displays the
output of the Minimodem listener on the command line.
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Below is a screenshot of the actual testing of steganography of the cat etc/passwd
command with music. In the background is the Audacity window, where the sounds where
combined into a .WAV file, with the stereo waveform of Sandstorm showing. In the left
command shell window, multiple commands for clearing the command shell to the right and
testing adding buffer spaces to command can be seen in the Minimodem listener output. In the
right shell window, the ultrasonic command has been piped to the shell thus directing the
operating system to parse the etc/passwd file showing the user accounts. For this test, we
transmitted from Hunter’s laptop’s speakers to his laptop’s microphones, from my laptop’s
speakers to his laptop’s microphone, and from my phone to his laptop’s speakers. All tests were
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successful.

The following images are the spectrograph tests discussed at the end of the Testing
Narrative section. Observe the listed peak value of approximately 18.6kHz and the two pronged
appearance of the peak showing the separation of the space and mark frequency. To the left of
the ultrasonic signal, environmental noise and music can be seen in the spectrograph. For this
spectrograph, the X axis is frequency in Hz and the Y axis is decibels. Ignore the red values.
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Dorm Noise Floor (LEFT) and Dorm + Ultrasonic Signal (RIGHT)
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Dorm + Ultrasonic Signal + Music
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Outdoor Noise Floor (LEFT) and Outdoor + Ultrasonic Signal (RIGHT)
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Outdoor + Ultrasonic Signal + Music

30

Ultrasonic Data Steganography

Alexander Edwards

Server Room Noise Floor (LEFT) and Server Room + Ultrasonic Signal (RIGHT)
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Server Room + Ultrasonic Signal + Music
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Commons Noise Floor (LEFT) and Commons + Ultrasonic Signal (RIGHT)

z
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Commons + Ultrasonic Signal + Music

Interpretations
The frequencies we chose within 18kHz can be considered arbitrary due to a multitude of
environmental factors effecting out tests, but we did have important practical conclusions. Lower
frequencies, like those in the 17kHz range may be easier to produce by stock device hardware,
but they are slightly within audible range and also closer in frequency to interference produced
by humans. Higher frequencies, like those above 19kHz are not handled well by device hardware
and often leads to distortion, chirping, and buzzing in speakers resulting in severe loss of fidelity.
Most hardware can handle up to 20kHz transmission before the signal is unusable; however, we
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do not know how drivers and other audio software effects this. Ultrasonic frequencies
sometimes produce a loud pop when they first are transmitted on certain hardware, most likely
due to an electrical surge in the speaker. It may be necessary to place buffer characters that can
accept interference for the pop before the payload of a transmission. Placing spaces as a buffer
before the cat etc/passwd command remedied this problem as spaces do not affect the parsing of
the command by the command shell. While we could have experimented with baud rate further,
the usable baud rate was roughly a function of distance + environmental factors + character set.
There may be some benefit from choosing a baud rate divisible bits per character (which is 8 for
ASCII), but this wasn’t tested.
As stated, data was receivable up to 8 feet at maximum hardware volume in the dorm and
Commons with the observable difference being that distance shrank to 6 feet outside and in the
server room. My project partner, Hunter Young, might differ on these measurements as "usable
distance" is subjective. The range can be extended with random losses to fidelity. We believe this
is due to mechanical noise from cars and server fans, but also air temperature and movement
from these factors might also have an effect. From our earlier tests we determined that while
obstacles in the way of a transmission, like people and servers, may not affect the ability to
receive a signal, the geometry of a room can. Reception of signals, at least on a spectrograph, in
their entirety is virtually impossible outside of a room unless directly in a doorway. Receiving
transmissions were extremely difficult when the speakers and microphones were not facing. This
may also be affected by the position of the hardware in the device. Therefore, the ultrasonic
signals are negligibly affected by obstacles, but are unable to reflect and diffract well.
Meshnetting as described in earlier sections might overcome this limit.
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Practical Conclusions
From these tests and with reinforcement by a few other researchers, it can be concluded
that, while the concept and technology are in their infancy, the ability to transmit data
ultrasonically between common consumer computers with their stock hardware is not only
feasible but constitutes a form of steganography relevant to the study of information security.
However, due to the fragility and low speed of the transmission, the amount of data practically
transferable is strictly limited reducing the “data” transferable to simple strings of characters
rather than entire information assets. Also, multiple sources along in our research have shown
distance to be a major limiting factor. This means that it may not be practical for infiltration
other than simple commands for mobile device management and targeting for malware or
exfiltration of confidential material beyond keylogging or passwords. This does not mean
corporations and governments capable of devoting massive resources cannot improve on this
concept technologically.
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Practical Applications
Suggestions
When utilizing this concept and developing software for it, during selection of
transmission parameters and use case of the software, it is imperative to consider the
environment where the software is intended to be used. This may not always be possible, so
reproduction and expansion of our tests may be prudent for long term development. The tests
performed for this project may be some use; the need for buffer characters to mitigate speaker
pop is a good example. In fact, this may mean that any applications of it must be very
specifically targeted. This may limit the malware feasibility of ultrasonic data transmission to
specific, contained attacks mostly likely as a cyber warfare weapon between nation-states against
particular facilities.
As observed, while it can provide data steganography, the concept of ultrasonic data
transmission is extremely fragile. However, while it may greatly slow down the transmission
time, it may be possible to ensure fidelity without longer exposure to interference through the use
of repetition and checking. The same transmission can be repeated several times and software
could be written to compare the transmissions, and select the characters that were interpreted
most often at each matching point in time across the matching signals to derive a “correct” string.
An XOR checksum or a word or character count may also be transmitted at the end of each
message for error correction. Longer checksums may be susceptible to inference themselves. If
two way transmission is intended, error correction can be further aided by asking the recipient
device for an “ok,”, “repeat,” or “verify” reply.
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Substitution commands and simpler character sets, like baudot, may be used to reduce
signal complexity and transmission time. For example, to instruct software to complete a task, a
two character symbol may be transmitted, in a shorter amount of time than an actual full
command recognized by a host system, to software that already has the command stored and is
listening for the execution prompt. There are caveats to this, though. Baudot, for example, is case
insensitive and may have issues with interpretation by operating systems with case sensitive file
systems. Using symbols requires the functional payload to already be stored on a on the
receiving system in the listening software. This makes the listener less discrete and susceptible to
heuristic detection if it is malware.
If exploration into this concept advances to the point where robust protocols can be used,
similar or identical to traditional computer networking protocols, the ability to send robust data
packets may be possible with enough error checking. Two of the earlier sources were able to
develop crude means of transmitting datagrams rather than the raw ASCII text that we were
testing with. While also relevant to information security and computer networking, we did not
test encryption due to the observed fragility of the data transmission. It is concluded that if
encryption is used, it should be done at the character level, not the binary level to preserve data
fidelity. Errors at the bit level errors could render entire messages unreadable.
Possible Theoretical Scenarios
The Fraunhofer FKIE study, while using a proprietary protocol stack, demonstrated the
concept of ultrasonic data transmission utilizing a meshnet that enhanced its usefulness
(Hanspach & Goetz, 2014). The BadBIOS scenario, whether a hoax or not, presented the idea of
discrete malware collaboration outside of the conventional network vectors thus potentially
allowing the formation of local botnets of airgapped systems (Goodin, 2013). If malware can be
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propagated to multiple systems in a close proximity, such as with the infected USB drive
suggested in BadBIOS, their effect could be amplified. As discussed earlier, the ability to have
malware on hosts avoid detection by being only a listener could act an information security time
bomb. If the listening malware is distributed densely enough, command payloads, in the form of
ultrasonic digital signals could “arm” the malware by many means including, but not limited to
shared music, videos, a passerby’s phone, or playing over an intercom. Also the attack could be
designed where only one host had to receive an audio payload, and, using stock microphones,
and speakers could transmit commands to all other listening hosts.
Also building on an idea from the Fraunhofer FKIE study, very small scale data
exfiltration can be an achieved, such as with the keylogger example. While transmitting
keystrokes discretely and acoustically may not provide much benefit over traditional keyloggers,
it could be used as a means of exfiltration when all traditional data connections are severed
(Hanspach & Goetz, 2014). There is also a well-known surveillance tactic using lasers to
eavesdrop on distant conversation. Laser light is pointed at a surface that will vibrate as it
absorbs local sound waves and the changes in the reflected beam are processed into sound from
far way. Perhaps this technology could be adapted to function with digital ultrasound. If a target
organization was to restrict network access by policy or by advanced security controls such as
metal shielding to contain radio waves from WiFi. An infected system or systems could transmit
data ultrasonically and vibrate a window, for example, and keystrokes can be received from a
laser microphone far outside the security perimeter.
Powerline Ethernet, a means of modulating the electrical current in a building with
special wall warts to send network traffic, is a common consumer solution. There are also
powerline audio adapters to eliminate the need to run new cabling for sound as well. While the
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use of powerline network adapters is common, powerline audio is less so and therefore might
appear to be ordinary electrical noise if it were used discretely in a building. If the technology
can carry ultrasound, it might be a means of overcoming the physical barriers that prevent the
propagation of ultrasound and even the physical barriers of a security perimeter given that the
carrying electrical lines cross that barrier.
There are also less malicious and also less security relevant usage scenarios for discrete
ultrasonic data transmission. Mobile Device Management could utilize the technology for offline
communication between peer devices or for the detection of nearby devices. The natural physical
containment of ultrasound could allow better control of local peer to peer networks. Also, as
demonstrated by SilverPush, it may be used to support and analyze marketing among device
users.
Security Controls
There are obvious security controls, such is including all known ultrasonic
communication software (like the software referenced in this project) in anti-malware definitions
and having heurist analysis detect any software that functions similarly. This is impractical as it
may require repetitive whitelisting of drivers and other audio software. The Fraunhofer FKIE
study proposes and idea of an intrusion detection system (IDS) sensitive to ultrasonic attacks.
They suggest analysis of audio input and output and any modulations present in the audio to
detect signals that might carry data (Hanspach & Goetz, 2014). My project partner and I suggest
another, cruder countermeasure: jamming. While it is a federal crime in the US to jam WiFi,
Bluetooth, and other radio bands, sound, especially inaudible sound, is virtually unregulated. A
quick search on Amazon.com reveals that tweeters, speakers designed for high pitched sounds, in
the many hundreds of watts are inexpensive (Pyramid TW36 7-Inch x 3-Inch 400 Watts Wide
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Dispersion Horn Tweeter). This would allow the cheap creation of large ultrasonic deadzones,
should attacks via ultrasonic data steganography become a significant threat. The only caveat
with jamming in this range is potential irritation to animals and people with acute hearing.
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